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Conflict of Laws-Survival of Support and the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act
" 'Confusion now hath made his masterpiece,' "' said Justice Jackson,
referring to the legal chaos engendered by the often conflicting matrimonial laws of the various states. When further complicated by the welltrod path to a foreign jurisdiction and a quick, ex parte divorce, more
often than not the domestic and divorce laws of the respective states,
rather than the spouses, become entwined in "holy deadlock.'"'
Perhaps the Rhode Island Supreme Court has begun to apply the
sword to the Gordian knot of legal problems that surround a foreign ex
parte divorce decree and its effect upon prior and subsequent support
proceedings. In Rymanowski v. Rymanowski,3 the court utilized the concept of "divisible divorce" 4 to uphold the validity of the husband's ex
parte Nevada divorce decree and, at the same time, granted the wife survival of a prior Massachusetts support order on the public policy grounds
that underlie the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(URESA).' The uniqueness of this decision is found in the fact that
under Massachusetts law the right to support granted in a prior support
order does not survive a final divorce decree.' It may well be that in
reaching its decision, the Rhode Island court, by implication, has proved
the obsolescence of the normal conflict-of-laws rule in this area of matrimonial jurisprudence.
After nine years of marriage, Joseph Rymanowski left his marital
domicile of Massachusetts and resided in Rhode Island. He commenced
divorce proceedings against his wife, Mary, in Massachusetts in August,
1962. Although his prayer for divorce was denied, the Massachusetts
court ordered Joseph to pay $180 per month for her support.
Shortly after his retirement from the Navy, Joseph's search for employment led him to Nevada. He arrived in Las Vegas on June 7, 1965,
and filed for divorce there on July 20, 1965. Although Mary received
' Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674, 676 (1949) (dissenting opinion) quoted in Baer,
The Aftermath of Williams vs. North Carolina, 28 N.C.L. REV. 265, 289 (1950).
'A. HERBERT, HOLY DEADLOCK (1934).
- R.I. -, 249 A.2d 407 (1969).
'Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948).
- R.I. at -, 249 A.2d at 412. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 15-11-1 to
-32 (1956). See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52A-1 to -20 (1966); UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT AcT, §§ 1-43 (1958 version) in
9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1967).
' MASS. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 209, § 32 (Supp. 1969) construed in Rosa v.
Rosa, 296 Mass. 271, 5 N.E.2d 417 (1936).

19691

SURVIVAL OF SUPPORT IN DIVORCES

notice of the pending suit, she did not make an appearance. Joseph
secured a divorce decree in the Nevada district court in August, 1965.
The decree omitted any provision for Mary's support. Joseph returned
to Rhode Island in November, 1965, and subsequently remarried.
Upon learning of the Nevada decree, Mary instituted a declaratory
judgment proceeding in Massachusetts to determine her marital status.
Joseph did not appear in this proceeding although he received notice
by publication. In December, 1965, the Massachusetts court adjudged
that Joseph's Nevada divorce was invalid and that he was still married
to Mary.
Mary then commenced support proceedings against Joseph in Massachusetts under the Massachusetts version of the URESA.7 Both parties
appeared in the Rhode Island family court. Joseph contended that he
owed Mary no duty of support, since under the Nevada divorce decree
she was no longer his wife. The trial court found that Joseph was a
bona fide domiciliary of Nevada at the time of the divorce, which therefore was entitled to full faith and credit, and dismissed Mary's petition
for support. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
Joseph's Nevada divorce decree was valid, but that Mary was entitled to
survival of support on the public policy grounds that underlie the
URESA.8
A brief examination of the evolution of the doctrine of "divisible
divorce" will be beneficial in order to appreciate the significance of the
court's disposition of the case.'
In Williams v. North Carolina,'° the State of North Carolina relied
on the ruling in Haddock v. Haddock" in prosecuting a couple for
bigamous cohabitation. After abandoning their respective spouses, the
couple obtained ex parte Nevada divorces and married each other there
before returning to North Carolina. Reversing their convictions, the
For an explanation as
' MASs. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 273A, §§ 1-17 (1954).
to the procedural nuances of the URESA see Brokelbank, The Problem of Family
Support: A New Uniform Act Offers A Solution, 37 A.B.A.J. 93 (1951); Note,

The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act: ProceduralProblems and
a Technological Solution, 41 TEmP. L.Q. 325 (1968); 44 TEXAS L. REV. 814

(1966).
'R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 15-11-1 to -32 (1956).
'The United States Supreme Court first grappled with ex parte divorce de-

crees in Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901), and Haddock v. Haddock,
201 U.S. 562 (1906), where it held that a divorce decree was entitled to full
faith and credit only when entered by a forum that had personal jurisdiction over
both parties or by a court of the state wherein the parties were married.
See Baer, supra note 1.
10317 U.S. 287 (1942).
11201 U.S. 562 (1906). See note 9 supra.
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Supreme Court expressly overruled Haddock" and held that ex parte
divorce decrees are to be accorded full faith and credit despite the fact
that the abandoned spouse was neither served with notice nor appeared
in the state that decreed the divorce. However, the Court expressly
reserved the question of whether North Carolina had to accord full faith
and credit to the Nevada decree when it in fact found that no bona fide
3
domicile was established in Nevada.1
The Supreme Court dealt with this question in the second Williams
4
v. North Carolina"
case (Williams II). North Carolina had secured con-

victions of the couple based on a finding that they had not established
a bona fide domicile in Nevada. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that full faith and credit did not preclude North Carolina from examining the jurisdictional facts to determine if a bona fide
domicile had indeed been established in Nevada. 5
Estin v. Estin'6 is the case generally credited with setting forth the
doctrine of "divisible divorce."'" In Estin the husband established a valid
domicile in Nevada, obtained an ex parte divorce, and promptly ceased
the support payments to his wife that had been ordered by a prior New
22 317 U.S. at 304.
" Id. at 302.
1325 U.S. 226 (1945). See Powell, And Repent At Leisure, 58 HARv. L. REv.
930 (1945). The rule that an ex parte divorce decree granted by a foreign state
may be collaterally attacked by proving that the spouse who obtained the decree
was not in fact domiciled in the granting state has been subsequently restricted by
the Supreme Court. The later cases hold that if both parties appeared in the
original proceeding the finding of domicile becomes res judicata and may not be
collaterally attacked even if the issue of domicile was not in fact contested. Cook
v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951);
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) ; Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 278 (1948). See
Carey & MacChesney, Divorces By The Consent Of The Parties And Divisible
Divorce Decrees, 43 ILL. L. Rav. 608, 611 (1948).
"On the same day that Williams II was decided, the Court handed down its
decision in Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex rel. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279 (1945).
In this case the husband contended that his obligation to furnish support to his
wife under a prior Pennsylvania support order terminated when he obtained an
ex parte Nevada divorce. The Court held that under Williams II, the wife could
defeat this contention by showing that the husband had not established domicile
in Nevada.
10334
U.S. 541 (1948). See Baer, The Law of Divorce Fifteen Years After
Williams v. North Carolina, 36 N.C.L. REV. 265 (1958); Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 HAIv. L. REv. 1287 (1951).
1
As early as 1869 the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a wife's alimony award
when her husband asserted his ex parte divorce in bar of her claim. The court
said, "It is not essential to the allowance of alimony that the marriage relation
should subsist up to the time it is allowed." Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502, 512
(1869). Also, it appears that Justice Douglas in Esenwein foreshadowed the result
reached in Estin. See 325 U.S. 279, 282 (1945) (concurring opinion).
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York decree. Upon being sued in New York for arrearages, the husband pleaded his Nevada divorce in bar of his wife's claim. Stating that
New York had a legitimate interest in the wife's right to support "lest
she become a public charge,"' the Supreme Court held that the prior
New York support order was a property right belonging to the wife and
that this right could not be taken away by a court lacking personal jurisdiction over her. "The result in this situation is to make the divorce
divisible-to give effect to the Nevada decree insofar as it affects marital
status and to make it ineffective on the issue of alimony.""1
The decision left undecided the effect of an ex parte divorce on a subsequent support order. The Court dealt squarely with this question in
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt.2 Mrs. Vanderbilt left her marital domicile of
California and moved to New York before her husband obtained an ex
parte Nevada divorce. After the Nevada decree was entered, she commenced support proceedings in New York. Mr. Vanderbilt appeared,
contending that the Nevada divorce terminated his obligation to support
his wife. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the decree
terminated the marital status, it did not extinguish Mrs. Vanderbilt's
right to support under a New York statute authorizing support after
divorce. 2' The Supreme Court affirmed. The majority relied on the due
process considerations enunciated in Estin-that a court could not proceed to extinguish a property right without having personal jurisdiction
over the individual. 22 Since the Nevada court lacked personal jurisdiction over Mrs. Vanderbilt, it could not terminate her right to secure
financial support from her husband under New York law.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court drew on many of the principles
enunciated in the aforementioned cases in reaching its decision in Ryma8 334

U.S. 541, 547 (1948).

19 Id. at 549.
20 354

U.S. 416 (1957).
"See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1964), as amended (McKinney

Supp. 1968). This section incorporates the language of N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT
§ 1170-b (1963), which was in effect at the time Vanderbilt was decided.
" But see Simons v. Miami Beach First Nat'1 Bank, 381 U.S. 81 (1965),

where the Court held that Florida could constitutionally extinguish an absent

spouse's dower interest in Florida property by means of an ex parte divorce

obtained by the husband in Florida. Justice Harlan concurred on the ground that
the Court's opinion constituted a partial retreat from Vanderbilt. Id. at 86-87.
justices Douglas and Black, concurring, rejected the notion that Simons was a
retreat from Vanderbilt and argued that the dower right "simply never came into

existence." Id. at 88. See generally Currie, Suitcase Divorce In The Conflict
of Laws, 34 U. Cni. L. Rxv. 26 (1967). See also Note, Divorce Ex Parte Style,
33 U. Cni. L. REv. 837, 844 (1966), wherein it is submitted that dower is a
valuable property right entitled to due process protection.
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nowski. The court, citing Williams II as its authority for examining
Joseph's domiciliary intent, held that he had indeed established domicile
in Nevada, and that therefore his divorce was valid. As to the question of
Mary's right to support, the court employed the concept of "divisible
divorce" enunciated in Estin: While Joseph's ex parte divorce was effective in terminating the marital status, it was wholly ineffective in terminating Mary's right to support.
Turning to the law of Rhode Island, the court stated that a wife's right
to alimony survives a valid divorce, subject only to the defenses of laches
and waiver.23 It matters little, continued the court, whether Mary's
claim is denominated "alimony" or "support"; what matters is that a
husband should not be relieved of his responsibilities to his abandoned
spouse. Following the "course of equity," the court felt no hesitancy in
holding that a wife's right to support continues undiminished when her
24
spouse leaves the state and obtains a foreign ex parte divorce.
The court declared that the purpose of the URESA25 was to remedy
the deplorable situation that exists when an individual abandons his dependents and leaves them to fend for themselves. To that end, the court
believed the statute should be liberally construed: To deny Mary her due
support would nullify the legislature's efforts. 20
27
The normal conflict-of-laws rule is that a disinterested forum will
look to the law of the wife's domicile as determinative of her right to
survival of support.28 If the laws of her domicile afford her survival of
support, then the forum state will do likewise. The court recognized
but refused to follow this procedure because (1) no evidence of Massachusetts law was before the court and it would not, sua sponte, notice judicially the laws of a foreign state, and (2) it could not ignore the public
policy evidenced by Rhode Island's adoption of the UJRESA2
21 Wilford v. Wilford, 38 R.I. 55, 94 A. 685 (1915).
R.I. -, 249 A.2d 407, 413 (1969).
"R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 15-11-1 to -32 (1956).
-6 R.I. -, 249 A.2d 407, 413 (1969).
2 The term "disinterested forum" refers to the situation whereby Rhode Island
looks to the laws of Nevada and the laws of Massachusetts as being dispositive of
the case. This situation is distinguished from the one in which the forum state
is concerned with the laws of only one other state.
8
E.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 49 Cal. 2d 389, 394, 317 P.2d 987, 991 (1957) ; Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 468, 283 P.2d 19, 21 (1955). It is interesting
to note that in each of these cases the laws of the wife's domicile afforded her
survival of support. See also Krauskopf, Divisible Divorce And Rights To Support, Property And Custody, 24 OHIo ST. L.J. 346, 355 (1963); Morris, supra
note 16, at 1301-03; Paulsen, Support Rights And An Out-of-State Divorce, 38
MINN. L. REv. 709, 717 (1954).
2R.I. -, 249 A.2d 407, 412 (1969).
2-
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What is the Massachusetts law that the court refused to notice judicially? Apparently, Massachusetts adheres to the principle that support is dependent upon the existence of a marital relationship.30 When
that relationship is terminated, the obligation to continue support payments under a prior order also ends.31
There are several practical reasons behind the court's refusal to follow
normal conflict-of-laws procedure. For one thing, to have held invalid
the Nevada divorce would have bastardized the issue of Joseph's second
marriage. For another, the court, by granting survival of support to
Mary, perhaps desired to prod Massachusetts into joining the weight of
authority.3 2 And from a practical standpoint, the court probably desired
to avoid making Rhode Island into a haven for deserting husbands from
Massachusetts.
Although the result in Rymanowski may well be socially desirable,33
"'Ingersoll v. Ingersoll, 348 Mass. 209, 210-11, 202 N.E.2d 820, 821 (1964);
Rosa v. Rosa, 296 Mass. 271, 272, 5 N.E.2d 417, 418 (1936). But see Adams v.
Adams, 338 Mass. 776, 157 N.E.2d 405 (1959).
"' There are several other jurisdictions, albeit a distinct minority, that also
afford a wife no survival of support after entry of a final divorce decree terminating the marital relationship. See Yates v. Yates, 155 Conn. 544, 547, 235
A.2d 656, 658 (1967); Meeks v. Meeks, 209 Ga. 588, 591, 74 S.E.2d 861, 864
(1953,); Shaw v. Shaw, 92 Iowa 722, 728, 61 N.W. 368, 371 (1894) (by implication) ; Lowry v. Lowry, 174 Kan. 526, 529, 256 P.2d 869, 871 (1953) ; Walker v.
Walker, 246 La. 407, 415, 165 So. 2d 5, 8 (1964) ; Upham v. Upham, 238 Md. 261,
265, 208 A.2d 611, 613 (1965); Anglin v. Anglin, 211 Miss. 405, 51 So. 2d 781
(1951) (by implication); Hanna v. Hanna, 224 Mo. App. 1142, -, 32 S.W.2d
125, 126 (1930); Brown v. Brown, -

Ore.

-,

-,

437 P.2d 845, 847 (1968);

Lorusso v. Lorusso, 189 Pa. Super. 403, 406, 150 A.2d 370, 372 (1959); Loeb v.
Loeb, 118 Vt. 474, 484, 114 A.2d 518, 526 (1955); Brady v. Brady, 151 W. Va.
900,

-,

158 S.E.2d 359, 364, 366-67 (1967).

Most support statutes refer to a "wife" and "husband." This has been judicially construed by some courts to mean that the marriage relationship must be
in existence in order for the wife to qualify for support. Paulsen, supra note 28,
at 712.
It has been pointed out that statutes concerning a wife's right to support were
enacted in the pre-Williants I era when the states felt no need to protect their
domiciliaries from foreign ex parte divorces. Support was incidental to local
decrees of separation and divorce. Hence, the statutes were not intended to deprive a wife of support should her husband obtain a foreign ex parte divorce.
See Note, Divisible Divorce, 76 HARv. L. REV. 123,3, 1241 (1963).
Hudson v. Hudson, 52 Cal. 2d 735, 344 P.2d 295 (1959). See Note, Conflict
of Laws: Divisible Divorce in California-Hudsonv. Hudson, 48 CALIF. L. REv.

303 (1960). See generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1953).
t" Query: Is there a likelihood that Joseph may become a public charge of
Rhode Island due to the fact that he must now support two families? But see
Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946): If enforcement of the wife's rights
jeopardizes the welfare of the husband or of his newly acquired family, a support
order usually can be modified on the ground of changed circumstances. Id. at 238
(dissenting opinion).
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the decision raises serious problems of full faith and credit.34 At the outset one is confronted with the question of whether Rhode Island should
have given full faith and credit by judicial notice to the Massachusetts
statute terminating the wife's right to support." While there is some
authority suggesting that foreign statutes be given full faith and credit,80
the general rule is that there is no federal constitutional mandate requiring that extra-territorial effect be given the statutory law of a sister
state.3
Rhode Island has adopted the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign
Law Act,38 the purpose of which is to provide an expedient means of
34 U.S. CONST. art.

IV, § 1, provides in part:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964) provides in part:
Such Act, records, and judicial proceedings [of any State, Territory, or
Possession] or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full
faith and credit within .

.

. the United States and its territories and Pos-

sessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory
or possession from which they are taken.
" The court cites Potemkin v. Leach, 65 R.I. 1, 13 A.2d 250 (1940), as authority for refusing to notice judicially Massachusetts law. This was a tort case
wherein the court, without citing any precedent or supporting authority, said:
The plaintiff contends in his brief that the Connecticut law applies to
this case; but there was no evidence introduced that the law of that state

. . . was any different from that of Rhode Island. Hence, if Connecticut
law should be applied, we must assume that the applicable lav of that state
is the same as the law of this state on this subject.
Id. at 8, 13 A.2d at 254. But see Paine v. Schenectady Ins. Co., 11 R.I. 411 (1877),
where the court said:
The first question is, whether we can take judicial cognizance of the law of
New York, or must presume it to be the same as ours until it is shown...
to be different. The decisions upon this point are conflicting, but we think
•.. State of Ohio v. Hinchman, 27 Pa. St. 479, rests upon the better reason.
The court there held that, when the judgment impleaded is the judgment
of a sister state, the court will notice ex officio the law of the state in
which it was rendered . . . We think the reasoning is sound, and that it is
not satisfactorily met by courts which adopt a different view.
Id. at 415-16.
" The Constitution requires full faith and credit to be given to the public
acts, as well as to the records and judicial proceedings of other states.
Although Congress has not prescribed the effect to be given statutes in other
states, as it did in the case of records and judgments, this has not prevented
the Supreme Court from requiring their recognition; with regard to
statutes, the Court has apparently considered the clause self-executing.
H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 609 n.22 (3d ed. 1949).
" Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939); Western Life Indem. Co. v. Rupp, 235 U.S. 261 (1914); Tennessee Coal,
Iron, & R.R. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914).
8R.I.
GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 9-19-2 to -8 (1956).
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ascertaining the law of any other state.3 9 A literal reading of the first
section of the Act would require Rhode Island to notice judicially Massachusetts law.4" While there is authority that a court may take judicial
notice of foreign law on its own initiative,4 1 the Act has also been interpreted as imposing no obligation on a court to do so;42 and many states
require that the foreign law not only be brought to the court's attention
by way of pleadings or allegations in the brief, but that reasonable notice
be given to the adverse party as well.43 Rhode Island apparently adheres
to this latter principle, and failure to provide reasonable notice will result
in the application of the law of Rhode Island.44
An additional threshold issue is whether the full faith and credit
clause demands that Rhode Island be bound by the Massachusetts declaratory judgment that Joseph's Nevada divorce was invalid. Although
"' [t] he principles of res judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well
as to other issues,' "" it should be noted that the declaratory judgment action was wholly ex parte; and Rhode Island could therefore legitimately
inquire into the jurisdictional facts of Joseph's Nevada domicile under
the broad language of Williams 11.46
Another problem is that the court, by granting Mary survival of support, impliedly gives full faith and credit to the prior Massachusetts
support order. The court thus runs afoul of the traditional limitation
that only final and conclusive judgments are entitled to full faith and
credit47 as well as the rule that a duty of support imposed by one state
"is of no special interest to other states and ...

is not enforceable else-

where under principles of the Conflict of Laws." 48 However, it is widely
Cliff
v. Pinto, 74 R.I. § 9-19-3
375, 60(1956),
A.2d 704,
707 (1948).
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 369,
provides:
"Every court of this state
shall take judicial notice of the common law and statutes of every state, territory
and other jurisdiction of the United States."
"E.g., Strout v. Burgess, 144 Me. 263, 68 A.2d 241 (1949).
"E.g., Scott v. Scott, 15a Neb. 906, 46 N.W.2d 627 (1951).
"E.g., Leatherbury v. Leatherbury, 233 Md. 344, 196 A.2d 883 (1964).
"Cliff v. Pinto, 74 R.I. 369, 60 A.2d 704 (1948).
"Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78 (1939), quoting American
Sur. Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 166 (1932).
"'"To permit the necessary finding of domicile by one State to foreclose all
States in the protection of their social institutions would be intolerable." Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 232 (1945). But see Baer, supra note 16, at
268: "Whether any other state, or any interested person who was not a party to
the Nevada proceedings would have the same privilege that was accorded to
North Carolina was not decided in Williams 2nd."
Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
"RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 458, comment a (1934). The incorrectness of this provision is recognized in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONrLICT OF LAWS (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
'
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recognized that one state may honor another state's support order as a
9

matter of comity.

4

Although the Rhode Island court reached a decision in Rymanowski
that is desirable in light of today's mobile society, one can only speculate
as to the final outcome had evidence of Massachusetts law been before
the court. It is submitted that the outcome would have been the same
and that the Rhode Island court has determined not to follow the usual
conflicts rule of the spouse's domicile being determinative of her right
to survival of support."
It is arguable that Rhode Island was in reality an ordinary forum
rather than a disinterested one 5 because Nevada really had no compelling interest in the litigation, other than the efficacy of its ex parte divorce
decree. By the court's upholding the validity of Nevada's divorce decree,
the interests of that state were entirely accommodated. On the other
hand, Rhode Island had a compelling interest in the suit because Joseph,
his second wife, and his child of that marriage were domiciled there. In
upholding Joseph's ex parte divorce, the court protected an interest of
Rhode Island-preventing the issue of Joseph's second marriage from being bastardized. Massachusetts likewise had a compelling interest in the
litigation-that Mary be furnished with support sufficient to prevent
her becoming a public charge. By granting Mary survival of support,
Rhode Island accommodated this interest. If Rhode Island could deem
itself cast in the role of an ordinary forum, under the URESA it could
look to its own law as dispositive of the issue of support,"2 thus reaching
the same result obtained in Rymanowski.
Moreover, the court could have grounded its decision strictly on
the language of the URESA, and avoided the normal conflicts rule.53
The policy that the Act stresses is that a husband should not be capable
of extinguishing his obligation to support his dependents by the simple
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

(Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964)

§ 436(a) (2). See also Note, Interstate Enforcement of Modifiable Alimony And
Child Support Decrees, 54 IOWA L. REv. 597, 600 n.27 (1969).
o See note 28 supra.

See note 27 supra.
"Wheeler v. Wheeler, 196 Kan. 697, 414 P.2d 1 (1966); Lambrou v. Berna,
154 Me. 352, 148 A.2d 697 (1959); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 152 Me. 161, 125
A.2d 863 (1956); Daly v. Daly, 21 N.J. 599, 123 A.2d 3 (1956); Green v. Green,
309 P.2d 276 (Okla. 1957); Bjorgo v. Bjorgo, 402 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1966).
"'R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-11-2(6) (1956) provides: "Duty of support includes any duty of support imposed or imposable by law, or by any court order,
decree or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether incidental to a proceeding for divorce, legal separation, separate maintenance or otherwise."
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expedient of crossing state lines. The language of the Act purports to
give a mandate to the responding state (Rhode Island) to utilize its laws
to determine whether a duty of support exists.5 4 If under the laws of the
responding state a duty of support is found, it is not necessary that the
responding state look to the laws of the abandoned spouse's domicile to
determine her survival rights; it can look to its own laws. Hence, the
judge-made conflict rule applying the law of the wife's domicile should
not survive under uniform support legislation.
There is authority that a wife should not be allowed to migrate to a
foreign forum in order to seek the benefits of its more favorable support
laws after the husband has secured an ex parte divorce." To allow her
to do so would violate the substantive due process rights of the husband. 6 It is conceivable that Rhode Island has in fact allowed the wife
to "migrate" to its forum, figuratively speaking, in order to benefit from
its laws, which afford her survival of support. Rhode Island thus obviates the necessity of the wife's literally migrating to a forum in order to
secure survival of support and enables her to avoid the due process
problems that she would confront if she were to seek refuge in a more
favorable forum expressly for this purpose. And this result is accomplished within the mandate of the URESA.
Rhode Island impliedly has shown the way to dispose of the normal
conflicts rule that the law of the wife's domicile is determinative of her
right to survival of support. The URESA has been enacted by every
state in the Union.57 Each state can utilize the language of the Act to
grant the wife survival of support as a matter of public policy and, on
the basis of its own laws.
Rhode Island, however, is one of the few states that retained the language of the 1950 version of the Act granting the wife an "election"
of either the laws of her domicile or the laws of the state wherein the
" R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-11-13 (1956) provides: "Duties of support enforceable under this chapter are those imposed or imposable under the laws of any
state where the alleged obligor was present during the period for which support
is sought or where the obligee was present when the failure to support commenced, at the election of the obligee."
" Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1957) (dissenting opinion);
Morris, supra note 16, at 1302.
" The situation in which the wife pursues the husband into a foreign jurisdiction in order to obtain personal jurisdiction over him for the purposes of enforcing a prior support order by litigating it as any foreign money judgment
should be distinguished.

" HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS
SEVENTY-SEVENTH YEAR 223 (1968).
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obligor resides."8 Such an election provides the wife with a forum-shopping opportunity. To combat this result, the Act was amended in 1952
to provide that the only applicable law is that of the state where the
pbligor was present during the period for which support is sought."0 The
amended version, while destroying the opportunity of the wife to forum
shop, allows the husband to shop for a favorable state in which to reside.
The states operating under this amended version and at the same time
affording a spouse no survival of support"0 face a dilemma. If they follow the Act and revert to the support law of their jurisdiction, the wife
has no right to survival of support-their own laws terminate it. In
such a situation, they may resort to the normal conflicts rule and find that
the wife is afforded the right of survival under the law of her domicile.
But what if the laws of her domicile likewise terminate her right to survival? The wife may then find herself without a remedy, and once again
matrimonial law is found in its familiar state of frustration. In order
to solve this problem, it would be beneficial if the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recommended legislation to insure uniform survival of support in the form of an amendment to the
URESA.
Since the present language of the URESA affords the husband an opportunity to forum shop, the Commissioners would also do well to
amend section seven to give the courts-not the obligee-the power of
election in order that they may exercise discretion in applying either
the law of the jurisdiction where the obligee resided when the failure
of support commenced or the law of their own jurisdiction."1
JOSEPia E. ELROD III

Criminal Procedure-Search and Seizure-The Permissible Scope
of a Frisk
Antagonism between the police and the judiciary is perhaps an
inevitable outcome ... of the different interests residing in the police
as a specialized agency and the judiciary as a representative of wider

community interests. Constitutional guarantees of due process of
law do make the working life and conditions of the police more diffi" R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 15-11-13 (1956). See note 54 supra.
" For a list of the states which adopted the 1952 amendment see 9C UNIFORM
LAws ANN. (Supp. 1967).
o See note 31 supra.
1This solution has been suggested previously. See Note, 44 TEXAs L. REv.
814, 818-19 (1966).

